Former Minister: Afghan Police Only Way To Victory In Afghanistan

By Jonathan Bronstein, Talk Radio News Service

As Iraqi security has improved, the situation security in Afghanistan has become increasingly unstable. The Obama Administration recently pledged to increase the amount of soldiers stationed in Afghanistan by 30,000, but critics claim that the only way to improve Afghan security is by cultivating the security forces themselves, not by adding more American soldiers.

Today, the United States Institute for Peace stated some of their alternative policies because they believe that a surge will inevitably fail.

One of the main problems with the Afghan police force presently, according to Ali Jalali, the Interior Minister of Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, is that the public does not trust the police. He cited an example where Afghan police officers at a checkpoint were armed only with rocket-propelled grenades, which intimidated the public. “Police is not only to protect people, but also they are responsible to protect the population and the rule of law,” he said.

The Afghani police system established after 2001 was ineffective because the financial resources were not given, and their role as protectors of the law mixed with the need to stop insurgents, Jalali said, adding that when the army and police have common goals, neither institution does their job effectively.

“Police should fight crime,” Jalali said. He would like to see police divided into two groups – traditional police and paramilitary police. Traditional police would patrol the streets and enforce the rule of law, whereas paramilitary police would patrol the borders and aid in fighting terrorists, he said.

Afghan security forces also suffer from a lack of training. Karen Hall, the Afghanistan Police Program Manager for the U.S. State Department, said that 75 percent of the Afghan military is illiterate.

“How can a police officer function if they can not fill out a police report, if they can’t effectively communicate to prosecutors what crimes an individual committed,” said Hall.

The casualty rate for Afghan police is three times as high as the Afghan military. Hall believes that this is the direct result of ineffective training mixed with a dramatic lack of funding during the beginning of the war in 2002. Afghan security forces received less than $1 billion dollars from the U.S., from to 2002 to 2005, the Afghan military received more than $16 billion per year.

Both Jelali and Hall agreed that the only way for at true victory in Afghanistan is dependent on how well the Afghan security forces can patrol their own nation. But the coalition forces have only deemed 12 of the 40 districts in Afghanistan independent and safe, Hall said.